THE UDC AND FID-A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
W. BOYD RAYWARD I I I J history of the organization is a sequence of expansions and contractions, of structural adjustments by which, despite two world wars, a long period of English indifference,6 and American suspicion,? it was able to survive as an important international bibliographic force.
The institutional history of FID is more than its several changes of name, although they are important as reflecting attempts to strike a balance between centralization and regionalism, between nationalism and internationalism. Other important issues that need 6It was not until the formation in 1927 of the British Society for International Bibliography (BSIB) as the English branch of IIB undcr Pollard and Bradford, enthusiastic advocatcs of IIB and UDC, that "documentation" became significant in England.
? As early as 1900, R. R. Bowker felt compelled to report to his American colleagues upon a visit he made in 1899 to IIB in order to reassure them that it was really a practical and working institution. ("Institut fnternational de Bibliographie," Library Journal [June, 1900], 25:273-74 .) The negotiations of IIB with ALA over the fate of the RBU, tentative as early as 1916 (see Library Jottrnal lMa"v,1916l, 41:314 and [June, 1916] THE UDC a closer and more intensive historical study than is normally given to FID. A full-scale history is not possible here, but IrID could be shown as a bibliographic organization gradually ancl alnrost involuntarily precipitated from its inrntediate historical context. A Iiuropean ancl a more general background tvould help more precisely to identify and determine the significance of the individual and institutional decisions by which ltlD was created and developed. 1'he ready acceptance in, at least, the Iirench-speaking parts of Iiurope of the hydra-headed bibliographic lnonster would need to take into account the proposals of Jullien,t" f)anjou," and Van der Haeghen.l5 The more gcneral background would be in terrns of a rvidespread, intense preoccupation in liurc4te as well as in England and Anrcrica, with the idea of unir,ersal bibliography.r'i Near the end of the nineteenth ccntury was added the ideal of international subject bibliography exar.nincd not only by internationally oricntccl learnecl societiesrT but even by governntent.l8 'l'hc gcneral purposc of this paper is to provide an approach to the kind of historical stucly clescribed above by examining UDC in a number of different but "historical" ways. The importance of I|ID lies in its being the major im- One might argue that it was primarily the difficulty of obtaining information from scientific and technical literature that initiated the bibliographic movcment of which documentation was part. If docurnentation, with its emphasis on real information and only incidentally on bibliographic information, could adequately cope with this material, it could cope with any.
Otlet, though constantly arguing a special theory of documentation, in the thirties apparently became convinced of the need for a more generalized theory. Initially, IIB was set up very definitely and was heartily applauded for this by Francis Campbell of the British Museum, himself a neglected but forward-looking student of bibliography, as "an exclusively scientific association,":2 which was to devote itself to the scicntific study of bibliography. "It is high time," wrote Campbell, "for the institution of such an association . . . confusion of tongues is bad enough, but confusion of books is worse."23 For him, what most recommended the IIB as distinct from the Royal Society's enterprise, begun at the same time, n'as its attempt to deal with literature as a whole according to a rationalized and systematic plan on a worldwide basis. The science lay in the plan. Almost forty years after the founding of the "exclusively scientific association," Otlet attempted to transcend the ration- 
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to.t alization of the particular that characterized his theorizing to that date. He attempted rigorously and logically to elaborate in precise terminology a general theory of documentation that would have an organization and development as close, lucid, and self-sustaining as any mathematical or scientific exposition. Such a theory considers documentation as a social phenomenon and attempts to set it as firmly as possible in epistemology. "We need now not only bibliography, the description of books, but bibliology, that is to say, a general science and technology of the document."2a The Traitd'6 and the Systdmatiquc are extraordinary documents, apparently never available in English. The nearest approach to their theorizing is that of Shera and Egan in the various papers culminating in "Foundations of a Theory of Bibliography,"26 and the introduction to Bradford's D ocumentation.2T The former makes a plea for a new kind of social epistemology. On the Continent some attempt was made to continue the conceptual development and refinement of documentation brought to such a high point by Otlet.28 Most ideas about documentation, however, subse- quently expressed a kind of anachronistic pragmatism and identified the "discipline" with a number of biases implicit in its earliest and most "shocking" form-with its relation to science and technology and its bypassing or selfconscious eschewal of traditional library techniques, on the onc hand, and on the other, with UDC. Lancaster-Jones recognizes the general vagueness of usage of ttdocumentation," but observes that the word is usually employed "in regard to the technical literature."'" Libraries, in his view, are mainly wedded to the bibliographical "notice," the technologist demanding more sophisticated service. Pages,'ln in his zeal lor documentation Otletstyle, appears anxious for the inevitable decline of libraries with their pernicious book-orientation. In their stead he sees rising up "documentoihdques," of which librarie.s will become but parts, "annexcs." Iror Rradford, documentation is simply UDC and documentary classification by UDC. Indeed, he can calmly describe the origins of documentation in Otlet and La Fontaine's realization that "technical material as well as scientilic needed, not merely to be catalogued and abstracted, but also classified by sr.rbject so that information on a special topic could be found."'rr III Of all the contributions of FID to the rvorld of learning, UDC may prove the most permanent and the most significant, perhaps because whatever its congenital defects and characteristics, 264 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY it was developed to become all but financially and adrninistratively independent of its source. Certainly its users and its uses are extraordinarily numerous and varied. Many of then,, while largely indifferent or unrelated to concepts of organization for eifective global documentation, ncvertheless contributed to the financial stability of an otherwise precarious venture.n2 In 1911 the list of institutions and individuals co-operating with IIB in matters of documentation (simply as members, or by using UDC or other conmon methods-so broadly interpreted as to be almost meaningless) filled sixty octavo pages of one of the Institut's publications.;r;] By 1951 the list of institutional users of UDC alone filled over thirty small quarto pages and included more than one thousand institntions. By that time there were also over 400 publications using UDC either for the classification of articles or of bibliographical data.ira The system was suggested as suitable for an enormously divcrse range of tasks and rvas actually used in many of them. Pollard suggests its value in the "cataloguing" of photographs, collections of coins, and collection of microscopic slides.'rb It was used for the classification of correspondence THE UDC files, patents, archives, to provide a flexible system for intercalation of pages, especially in loose-leaf reference books, for accounts (in 1904 over thirty tramway companies had adopted such a scheme), for the arrangement of glossaries, and so on.36
The partictilar editions of the work over the years testify to its wide international use. Portions of eight complete cditions have been published in frve languagcs up to 1961. Partial editions may be explained on the grounds of cost, the size of the fully-extended work, and the irrelevance of most of it to specialists onlv interested in a fragment of the whole. The first edition (French) appeared as the Manucl du Rdpcrtoirc Ribliograpkiqua Uniacrscl. The second (French) and third (German) editions werc complete, but the later editions (Iinglish, French, Japanese, Spanish, ancl Gcrman ) are all incomplete. In the periocl 1938-61 abridged editions appearcd in thirteen languages together with an abridged trilingual edition in 195ti. N{any editions of special parts and selectcd or excerptcd editions have appeared."t Because of such considerable and inlernational use, UI)C has been subjected to continuous critical scrutiny. A range of these criticisms suggests continuing clifliculties in the classification for both students of classification and for librarians and other daily users. N{any of the nrost characteristic and perhaps controversial aspects of the classification relate it through Otlet's vision of a documentary utopia to a par- Though the classification has naturally evolved with the passage of time, it has remained, basically, structurally, the same; one of the earliest English descriptions remains one of the best. In I926 Pollard published a translation of part of the Manuel du Rdpcrtoirc Bibliographique Univcrsel to serve as a guide to his Decimal Index of the Transactions of the Optical Society of which he was then secretary. In his definitive introduction he wrote:
The decimal bibliographic classification of the Institut International de Bibliographie consists of a most systematic table of subjects in which knowledge is bibliographically but not philosophically classed, with as much logical order as possible, proceeding from the general to the particular, from the whole to the part, from the genus to the species.
Each subject in this table is represented by a decimal number composed of one or more figures according to the degree of generality. These numbers are decimal in the sense that each figure towards the right does not modify the actual value of the preceding figures, but corresponds to a subdivision of the subject represented by them. The order in which the figures follow one another is thus the decimal oider.
Certain groups of numbers distinguished by special signs, when combined with the simple decimal numbers and with one another to foim compound numbers, enable multifarious and various notions to be represented.
The signs are given a-definite succession order so that the compound numbers may be filed in definite order with the simple numbers. The whole classification is completed by an atphabetical index of subjects with their corresponding decimal numbers. By indexing documents, or even objects which are not of a bibliographical nature, with the classification numbers, collections can be made, ranged in methodical or- Jesse Shera has taken exception to these judgments of UDC. He concludes that those characteristic features so highly praised by some are really weaknesses. "The Universal Decimal (Classification) was of course derived from Dewey, but its makers strove to achieve added dimensions, depth and flexibility by the use of certain signs of association to indicate relationships and points of view. The result was not inrprovement but greater complexity and serions magnification of the weaknesses inherent in the parent scheme."a3 He goes on to remark that the rapidly growing volume of graphic records, that which was responsible in a sense for UDC in the first place, is making "traditional Iibrary classifications hopelessly inadequate."44 One should stress, of course. that UDC was never conceived or intended as a "traditional library," but as a "documentary" classification. Nevertheless, problems arise from the use of the auxiliary tables and the signs of association. The 1961 BSI edition recognizes a process of their "hiding" information. Metcalfeas is strongly critical of this tendency. The criticisms of Metcalfe, Ranganathan, and Shera against the "D.C. core" (a rather misleading concept even though UDC initially derived from DC)*t are of a certain kind. They relate to the philosophy or systematics of classification in general. They are also, in a sense, criticisms of outsiders taking some kind of overview of the system. More concrete criticism tends to come from within the ranks of UDC users themselves. This deals with the classification itself, its present subdivisions, their inadequate specifications, and the illogical or erroneous conjunctions they present. One might say that the first kind of criticism is more closely related to bibliographical application of the classification, and the second to the derivation of the classification in the systematics of science and other kinds of TI{E LIBRARY QUARTERLV knowledge. The scientific specialists working on the revisions, extensions, and improvements of UDC are not concerned with the auxiliary schedules or with their use in relation to the main tables in order to obtain the greatest possible degree of bibliographical specificity but with the elaboration and relation of subjects in the main tables themselves. The problems they encounter there are mainly "subject" probIems; but they inevitably lead to the more basic awareness of the difficulties of extending and changing the notation of the nrain tables to permit intercalation of new subjects and rearrangements of the old.
At the same time Ranganathan was fonnulating what might be thought basic criticisms of UDC as both a bibliographic classification and one necessarily attempting to reflect the organization of knowledge, Scholten, an "insider," was considering the latter a.spect very closely from the point of view of the future development of the classification. His observations and conclusions are very interesting, the latter being similar to those of Ranganathan. When subjected to close logical scrutiny and confronted rvith the development of science and technology, the order of the main divisions is illogical, he concluded, and parts of the classification have been wrongly developed or are now clearly antiquated. But he recognizes the enormous diffrculty of holding in balance the need to adjust the classification frpquently so that "it follows the trend [f changing knowledge but becomes difficult to use," and the need to hold the classification fairly stable so that it can act as a standard, but thereby becomes "antiquated and for that reason difficult to use too."{!} He also makes the extremely important distinction that the classification is not the decimal notation. Even though it is true that it was "the determining factor which induced La Fontaine and Otlet to adopt Dewey's system, in the present state of development of the system, it can no longer be said that the decimal notation constitutes its principal characteristic." Above all, UDC is a classification, "i.e., a system which should be divided according to principles of consistency, mutual exclusiveness and collocation, that secondly it is a uni,acrsal classification, and that thirdly, this classification is divided according to a deci,mal notation."50 Bradford, upon encountering this kind of criticism, or, more specifically, particular instances which it generalizes, would agree that the classification may well be all of this, but he would assert that it is primarily a bibliographlc classification and would demand that the original purposes for which it was compiled be kept in mind before essaying criticism of it. His comments on the criticism of the classification by J. V. Jachssl in the field of soil science are in this vein. Bradford stresses that the classification is not philosophic, nor is the order of the subjects the main concern: "We must not forget that the primary purpose of the classilication is not to put the literature of a science in order, but to arrange all documents in such a way that they can be found as quickly as possible, and to enable the many workers to collaborate in making a single comprehensive index of all knowledge, in which all the references THB UDC to the literature of a small topic can come together."52 It is interesting that Shera and Egan were able to conclude that one consequence of Bradford's support of UDC has been to encourage its establishment as a "standard medium of communication that transcends the barriers of nationality and language"-this being in their view one of the important contributions of classification to the international world of scholarship.s'i
These few but representative criticisms suggest that there is a continuing difhculty in understanding just what UDC is trying to do. The confusion arises from UDC's notation. Every bibliographic classification, whether principally "bibliographic" or not, has at least three important aspects. The classification must relate to the world of knowledge and give it some meaningful structure. Iivery classification embodies willy-nilly a "philosophy" of knowledge or is philosophical-it reflects and represents the systematics of science and of knowledge in general; it is taxonomic. It must also permit .subject specification and be sufhciently flexible to identify and relate to its main structure subjects nTeaningfully related bibliographically or not precisely enumerated in the classi{ication itself . It must also permit document specification. Each of these three aspects, platitudes perhaps of classification theory, depends upon the classification's notation, and though one must agree with Scholten and with Metcalfe (who constantly urges that the distinction be kept clear) that a classification is not its notation, nevertheless, for the classification to be known and used, it 6!lZrid., pp. .55-56. AND FID 269 must be represented symbolically by a notation. One might generalize and say that different classifications tend to emphasize one or another of these aspects. Dewey, with its rigidity of ordering, "the Procrustean bed of the decimal ten', from which it constantly tries to escape, is oriented more to a world of knowledge whose unbridled growth has increasingly strained its categories and subdivisions to bursting point. It is less capable of flexible and complex subject specification, granted its necessity, than, say, CC with its emphasis on the synthesis of "elementary particles," as the basis of subject indication.sa UDC, on the other hand, has a different kind of division of emphasis. This has been tacitly recognized by its proponents and its critics alike. It is a vast, systematic table of subjects-it is "nothing less than a method for expressing notions of the mind in figures."55 It is one of the most comprehensive classifications ever published-it attempts to cover all variations of points of view. It is a universal classification-((i1 is a practical system for numerically coding information."s0 It goes beyond document specification and subject indication to document coclification. The original importance of the notation must be recognized, but its 6'It is intercsting in this context to note that as early as 1930, just before the spate of publications by Ranganathan began (the first edition of CC was issued in 1933), Duyvis reviewed trcnds in science towards synthetism, and examinecl and rcjccted the possibility in the near future that UDC rvould have to be reconstituted to dcal with "polydimensional reprcsentations" along lines similar in broadest outlinc to thosc of CC (F. Donkcr Duyvis, "4th Report of the Commission de la Classification Decimale," Documentatio Universalis ItO:t], pp.
sl-s2). 
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continuing importance under the exigencies of effective classification must be deprecated.
The classification is, in a sense, schizophrenic-there is a division between the classification itself (the vast, ordered elaboration of subjects) and its notation. They rival and conflict with each other Jor domination. As a bibliographical classification, it was designed minutely to specify the subjects contained in documents by using its notation to relate a given document to as much of the classification as possible, so that its different relevances might be known. A machinery of number compounding and reversal is provided for this. But the classification, the schedules, and the signs of association can be used actually to express all the shades of "ideologico-bibliographical analysis" of a document. The notation then becomes primary and subordinates the classification to its own purpose which is essentially linguistic, not bibliographic. Pollard briefly adverts to Otlet's belief that the notation of UDC could be used as a language, the decimal numbers being regarded as ('number roots" which may be converted into "number words" by coupling with them "auxiliary numbers expressing grammatical functions." Thus, "a medical corps will transport by cargo-boat the enlisted volunteers affected with asiatic cholera" becomes: 356.33001; 629-123.14063 of this is irrelevant. "The only end for which the Decimal Classification is essential is for bibliographic co-operation."5s Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that there are, as it were, two identities often at conflict within UDC -one bibliographic and the other linguistic. A pursuit of the origins of this latter aspect, generally neglected, along rvith a full understanding of what Otlet, and even Bradford, meant by "bibliographic co-operation" helps to provide a new kind of historical perspcctive for both UDC and FID.
IV
Otlet's attempted resolution of the linguistic-bibliographic duality in UDC puts him into a particular stream of European philosophy. In its most ir"r.rpassioned expressions, his vision of bibliographic organization conrpletcly transcended the practical limitations that must necessarily have been in-rposcd upon any contemporary manifcstations of it, and he saw in his mind's eye a great, dynamic, global encyclopedia, with tributary streams flowing into it and swelling it from every country in the worlcl. He is, therefore, the fellow of chambcrs, Buffon, Diderot, and the other encyclopedists. But his conception of UDC as the complement of this vast international venture, that is to say, as an international language, as an international documentary information encoding device, places hirn in the company of a group of seventeenth-century philosophers of whom Dalgarno and Wilhins were the most important. To both groups, classification was essential. Dut the conjunction of these two elements in his theorizing suddenly presents us with Otlet in conversation with a par6Bradford, "Univcrsal Decimal Classificalion," op. cit, (see n. 4 above), p. 66.
THE UDC ticular seventeenth-century philosopher and encyclopedist, Leibniz.
In the seventeenth century there rvas great concern over the nature of language and its inadequacies for scientific work, especially after the decline of Latin, the use of which had precluded all the linguistic vagaries of a vernacular. A movement had been begun to devise a language to take the place of Latin, a universal philosophic and scientific language which would be "firstly an international auxiliary language for communication between people with different native tongues; secondly, a symbolic language for scientific purposes, truly expressing the nature of things; and thirdly, an in.strument for scientific inference."50 Moreover, the character of the language, the word, the sign, was to be not merely an arbitrary symbol for the thing, but should indicate thc thing's nature. "It should, as it were, represent its real definition." Hopefully, it would be lihe the symbolism of mathematics in its simplicity, precision, and convenience. A method of proceeding rvas suggested by Descartes. This was to isolate a set of "clear and sirnirle ideas" from which more complex notions could be synthesized. Classification, therefore, would become central to the venture. Bishop Wilkins, who actually invented such a language, proceeded to find and arrange the fundamental and other notions and things by traditional delinition pcr gcnus et diffcrcntiam., and tried to fit everything into an hierarchical organization like the taxonomic arrangements of botany or zoology. 
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Leibniz, however, wanted to go further than these linguists. He recognized that "learned men have long since thought of some kind of language or universal characteristic by which all concepts and things can be put into beautiful order, and with whose help different nations might communicate their thoughts and each read in his orvn language what another has written in his." But, he goes on, proposing something new: "No one has attempted a ianguage or characteristic which includes at once both the arts of discovery and of judgment, that is, one whose signs or characters serve the same purpose that arithmetical signs serve for numbers and algebraic signs for quantities taken abstractly."00 This idea long remained with hini, Leibniz tells us, for with a characteristic such as he proposes the "human race will have a new kind of instrument which will increase the power of the mind far more than any hitherto devised" (an instrument, as Otlet was to observe in a similar context, "capable of acting powerfully on the very form of thought itself").6r How to arrive at the characteristic was the problem. Eventually Leibniz concluded: Nothing more is necessary to establish the characteristic which I am attempting, at least to a point sufficient to build the grammar of this wonderful language, and a dictionary for the most frequent cases, or, what amounts to the same thing, nothing more is necessary to set up the characteristic numbers for all ideas, thln to develop a philosophical and mathematical "course of studies" as it is called based on a certain new method which I can set forth. . . . 
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Nor rvould it require more work than is already being spent on a number of courses or encyclopedias as they are called.62
Indeed, he claims that a few selected men would take but two years to work out from first principles by an ,,infallible calculus" of his devising the doctrines "most useful to life. that is. those of morality and metaphysics."o3 The difficulties in establishing the characteristic, as Jones points out,6a are clearly twofold. First, "suitable inferential procedures" for the calculus ratiocinator were needed,{in and, second, "an appropriate conceptual classification of knowledge" was necessary for the identification and ordering of ideas so that they might be assigned "characteristic numbers." In seeking some insight into the concepts out of which our knowledge grows, Leibniz postulated an "alphabet of thoughts or a catalogue of the highest genera out of whose courbination inferior concepts may be formed."66 I'he main task, then, becomes one of finding a "real definition" for derivative or composite concepts, and this involves the resolution of the concept or "thing" into "simple primitive notions." I.'rom these definitions all truths can be demonstrated, and ultimately there can be derived f rom thern "the elements of eternal truth in all things insofar as we under- stand them." By u proper balance between analysis and synthesis, men will be able to bring under full control ,,our human knowledge of nature," which to Leibniz seems "at present like a shop well provided with all kinds of wares but without any order or inventory.', Having gathered up all useful experimental historical and other material which "does not possess metaphysical necessity,tt one may then ,,prepare a record of phenomena from which a mixed knowledge can be formed by combining all truths abstracted from experience." From conceptual analysis and classification, and the development of a logical calculus, one may obtain, largely by deduction, that is to say, a universal encyclopedia of knowledge. In one of his last schemes for such an encyclopedia,cT Leibniz proposed that it be divided into three parts: a universal atlas, the encyclopedia itself which would contain the systematic analysis and synthesis of the sciences, and a small summary of the principal features of the main part. But the same tasks of analysis, classifrcation, and calculation that would produce the encyclopedia would also establish the main element of his universal language-the universal characteristic. This seventeenth-century linguistic philosophers) stone would need to be represented by a notation. Leibniz considered using letters and other notational forms, but he seelrs most to have believed in the eflicacy of numbers for his purpose, and basic to his thought was the need to assign "characteristic numbers" to most concepts.(r8 Primitive concepts once isolated would be repre- THE UDC sented by ttnatural" signs or numbers. "Complex concepts would then be represented by complex signs composed of primitive signs in such a way that their nature, that is their relation to the simple concepts, would be apparent from the structure of the signs."oe The manipulation of these signs by a logical calculus, by which the language would becorne a kind of higher mathematics, would rid discourse of fallacious argument and obfuscationi0 and would permit the orderly synthesis and progression of knowledge in an encyclopedic form.
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In effcct, the figurcs which represent the classes and divisions of each subject unite into a single extremely simple numerical expression. The affrliation, the genealogy evcn, of the ideas and the objects, their dependence and subordirr:rtion . . firrd an adequate representation in the bibliographic sign so formed. This representation nearly excludcs the conventional and the arbitrary. Not only docs each figure express in its fashion an essential idea, hut the combination of frgures, that is to say, their order in thc series and their place in the number, are produccd everr accorcling to the laws of scientilic logic. In this sensc they constitute a true nerv language in which the phrases (here numbers) arc formed according to constant syntactical rulcs from frgures (here numbers). It is a kind of synthctic language ("aglutinante"): the figures arc tl-re predicative and attributive roots in it-purely vcrtral roots in the sense that they are neither substantive, nor adjective, nor verbs. They arc placed above and outside grammatical catcgories, in that they express atrstractions, pure scientific categories. Under this double head, the Decimal Classification constitutes a veritable international scientific language, a complete symbology of science, susceptible of to-day bringing to the intellectual workers, help analogous to that which they received in the Middle Ages . . . AND FID LIJ Here, in effect, is a summary expression by Otlet of many of the seventeenth-century notions about a "real" character and an international scientific language, and an extension for it of Leibniz's tentative use of numbers. UDC is not even merely to provide an "alternative notation for existing language" that was one form the need for an international language took in the seventeenth-century.72 It is more, for it is but a step from the isolation of "pure scientilic categories," the derivation of expressions in the language by the use of "the laws of scientific logic," to some form of the "calculus ratiocinator." But Otlet never pursued this much further. He became more interested in a new form of the encyclopedia which documentation using UDC alone could accomplish. The role of a particular classification such as UDC in this enormous venture is not fully and clearly developed by Otlet perhaps because he took it for granted. He does not make explicit the same kind of interconnection that Leibniz did between the language, the classification, and the encyclopedia. But the implications of the developing idea of the encyclopedia for UDC are worth examining and suggest that both, after Leibniz, are interesting conceptual atavisms. Given the decimal language described so enthusiastically by Otlet, materials ordered according to the minute classification it reflects inevitably take, perhaps crudely, the encyclopedic form envisaged by Leibniz. Because of the detailed specification of class and subclass, UDC permits a "perfect localization" 
